The rents of the top 1%

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Our points

- 1. Top 1% income gains are redistribution of rents, not rewarding skills/productivity;
- 2. Top 1% gains have been impediments to income gains for vast majority;
- 3. Reversing accumulated or further rents has little or no adverse impact on growth;
- 4. Complementary policies: dismantle sources of rent and reduce rent-seeking behavior via higher marginal taxes.

Income Inequality Dynamics


- Growing concentration of wages and compensation
- Growing concentration of capital income
- More capital income, less labor income
- Wealth inequality

Top 1 Percent incomes

			Capital Income					
			Dividends*, interest and	Capital	S-corporation dividends and proprietors' income (business	Total Capital		
Top 1 share	Total income	_labor_	rent	gains	income)	Income	other	transfers
1979 2007	8.9% 18.7%	4.1% 8.8%	26.9% 43.8%	58.5% 74.2%	21.3% 50.6%	31.8% 56.2%	5.0% 7.1%	1.0% 1.0%
Income catego	ry share							
1979	100.0%	69.8%	10.2%	3.6%	4.5%	18.3%	3.2%	8.7%
2007	100.0%	60.3%	8.7%	8.0%	6.1%	22.8%	6.3%	10.7%

Source: Authors' analysis of CBO (2012)

Figure 2M Cumulative change in real annual household income, by income group,



Note: Data are for comprehensive income. Shaded areas denote recessions. Source: Authors' analysis of data from the Congressional Budget Office (2010)

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




Figure 2V Share of total household capital income claimed, by income group, 1979–2007




Source: Authors' analysis of Congressional Budget Office (2010)

Capital income as a share of total income, 1979-2007



Source: Authors' analysis of Congressional Budget Office (2010)


Effect of the shift from labor to capital income on the top 1 percent of total household income, selected years, 1979–2007 (2011 dollars)




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
Source: Authors' analysis of Congressional Budget Office (2010)

Figure 1H Share of average income growth accounted for by the top 5 percent and top 1 percent, by dataset and income concept, 1979–2007



Source: Authors' analysis of Piketty and Saez (2012, Table A-6), Congressional Budget Office (2010), Burkhauser





Note: Data are for comprehensive income.

Source: Authors' analysis of Congressional Budget Office (2010)


Rents

Labeling any group's income growth as largely stemming from economic rents does not necessarily imply that they are illgotten gains. Instead, all it means is that this income growth was in excess of what was needed to induce them to supply labor and capital to these respective markets.

Key drivers of top 1% incomes

- Executives, escalating pay
- Financial sector, larger and better paid


Share of total income* of the top 1.0% of earners, by occupation, 1979–2005



^{*}Household income including capital gains


Note: data available for years 1979, 1993, 1999, 2001, and 2005. Intervening years calculated by linear interpolation. Source: Author's analysis of Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2012, Tables, 4, 5, 6a, and 7a)

Figure B Excess pay in the financial sector



Source: Authors' analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts data


Figure 4AH CEO-to-worker compensation ratio (options granted and options realized) 1965–2011



Note: "Options granted" compensation series data include salaries, bonuses, restricted stock grants, options granted, and long-term incentive payouts for CEOs at the top 350 U.S. firms ranked by sales. "Options exercised" compensation series data include salaries, bonuses, restricted stock grants, options exercised, and long-term incentive payouts for CEOs at the top 350 firms ranked by sales.

Sources: Authors' analysis of data from Compustat ExecuComp database, Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics , and Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts

Comparison of CEO compensation to top incomes and wages, 1947-




Relative CEO and college wages, 1979-2010

		<u>Ratio</u>			<u>Log Ratio</u>			
	CEO comper	College to:		CEO compensation to:		College to:		
	top 0.1%	top 0.1%	High School		top 0.1%	top 0.1%	High School	
	households	wage earners	Hourly wages		households	wage earners	Hourly wages	
Ratio								
1979	1.18	3.16	1.40		0.164	1.151	0.338	
1989	1.14	2.55	1.57		0.128	0.936	0.454	
1993	1.56	2.95	1.63		0.443	1.083	0.488	
2000	2.90	7.53	1.75		1.063	2.019	0.557	
2007	1.49	4.23	1.76		0.396	1.442	0.568	
2010	2.06	4.70	1.77		0.725	1.548	0.574	
Change								
1979-2007	0.31	1.07	0.36		0.23	0.29	0.23	
1979-2010	0.89	1.54	0.37		0.56	0.40	0.24	
1989-2010	0.93	2.15	0.20		0.60	0.61	0.12	

Policies

- Higher marginal tax rates
- Corporate governance
- End tax preference for CEO performance pay
- Financial transactions tax
- Policies to raise wages for bottom 99%: collective bargaining, minimum wages, labor standards levels and enforcement

Figure 2Q Average effective federal tax rates, by income group, 1960–2004




Note: Data are for tax units

Source: Authors' analysis of Piketty and Saez (2007, Table 2)


End

Figure A Average annual income growth by fractiles, by time-period and data-



^{*} Indicates data goes from 1979 to 2005 Source: Authors' analysis of data from Piketty and Saez (2003, updated) and CBO (2012)

Figure 2U Cumulative change in real annual household capital income, by income group, 1979–2007



Note: Shaded areas denote recessions.

Source: Authors' analysis of Congressional Budget Office (2010)